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ABSTRACT
This report reviews and summarizes the hazards to aerospace
vehicles caused by hydrogen. Topics such as flammability limits of
hydrogen in hydrogen-oxygen and hydrogen-air mixtures, methods
of detecting hazardous conditions, and means of inhibiting fires and
explosions are discussed. Although relatively few references were
found in the literature concerning hydrogen fire and explosion haz-
ards in aerospace vehicles specifically, it is generally believed that
many of the procedures used in the handling, storage, and transpor-
tation of liquid hydrogen in more conventional applications also apply
to hydrogen used as a fuel in space vehicles.
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FOREWORD
This report attempts to review and summarize the published
literature concerning the hazards to which aerospace vehicles may be
exposed because of the use of liquid hydrogen as a fuel. The literature
search, which covered the period of 1955 to the present time, yielded
relatively little information concerning the safety aspects involved in
the use of hydrogen in space vehicles. This, of course, was not
surprising since most of the technology that has been developed for
the safe handling of liquid hydrogen in other applications also applies
to aerospace vehicles.
The information for this report was taken from the sources
available at the Redstone Scientific Information Center which, in addi-
tion to the Center's holdings, includes NASA and DDC computer tape
searches.-':-" The following indexes also were consulted for the time
period covered in this report:
Applied Science and Technology Index
British Technology Index
Chemical Abstracts
Chemical Propulsion Abstracts
Engineering Index
Fuel Abstracts
Government-wide Index to Federal Research and
Development Reports
Index Aeronauticus
Journal of Applied Chemistry Abstracts
Nuclear Science Abstracts
Science Abstracts
-':-'TheNASA tape searches provide references from the Scientific
and Technical Aerospace Reports (STAR} and the International Aero-
space Abstracts, while DDC searches provide references to the report
literature in the Department of Defense.
iii
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Section I. INTRODUCTION
The primary impetus behind the production and use of large
quantities of liquid hydrogen has been the development of upper stages
for large space rockets. Liquid hydrogen, because of its high reactiv-
ity and the low molecular weight of its combustion products, produces
more specific impulse than any other chemical fuel. These advantages,
however, are accompanied by some disadvantages, one of which is the
hazard associated with its use. Hydrogen gas, because of the small
size and high mobility of its atoms, can leak through air-tight seals;
and if it leaks into a confined space where air or oxygen is also present,
it can form a detonable gas mixture. Prevention of such situations by
proper design of aerospace vehicles is, of course, of utmost importance;
but in spite of all the preventive measures, hazardous conditions still
can be encountered.
A considerable amount of information is in the literature concern-
ing the flammability and detonation properties of hydrogen and the
chemical reaction between hydrogen and oxygen. 1'z Although an under-
standing of the reaction mechanism between hydrogen and oxygen is a
necessary part of any consideration of the hazardous characteristics of
hydrogen, little such information is included in this report. Lewis and
yon Elbe have studied these properties extensively, and the reader
wishing more information on this subject is referred to their work. i
There was relatively little information in the literature concerning the
suppression or inhibition of hydrogen-oxygen fires, and even less on
the hydrogen hazards to which aerospace vehicles may be exposed.
Considerable effort is being made in the area of detection of
hazardous hydrogen mixtures, and a large portion of this survey is
devoted to this topic. It was found that developments in this area could
be most conveniently summarized according to the organization by
which the work was performed. Although every effort was made to
include all significant work as reflected by the literature, the list of
organizations working in this field may not be complete.
The last section of this survey, entitled "Hydrogen Hazards to
Saturn Space Vehicles" is an attempt to summarize the current thinking
concerning the hazards to which these space vehicles may be exposed
because of their use of liquid hydrogen engines. It appears that most
safety principles are based on proper design to prevent the formation
of dangerous gas mixtures and/or their ignition, rather than to combat
a fire or explosion after it is initiated. A portion of the information
contained in this section was gathered from discussions with several
persons at NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center.
Section II. LIMITS OF FLAMMABILITY AND DETONATION
1. General
The principal hazard associated with gaseous or liquid
hydrogen is its ease of ignition over a wide flammability range in air
and oxygen. The combustion limits of hydrogen in air range from
about 4 percent to 74 percent hydrogen by volume. In oxygen the upper
limit is extended to about 94 percent. The limiting compositions for
detonation of hydrogen-air mixtures are from approximately 18 to 59
percent hydrogen by volume. Figure l gives the flammability limits of
some common gases in air. Only hydrazine and acetylene have broader
ranges of flammability than hydrogen. 3
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Figure I. Flammable Limits in Air
The ignition temperature of hydrogen in air at atmospheric pres-
sure is approximately 1075 ° F, while most hydrocarbons can be ignited
between 400°and 600 ° F. This may lead one to believe that hydrocarbon
fuels are easier to ignite than hydrogen, but actually the energy required
to enflame hydrogen is only about one tenth of that required to enflame
typical hydrocarbons. Figure 2 shows a comparison of the spark igni-
tion energies of hydrogen-air and propane-air mixtures.
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Figure 2. Spark Ignition Energies of Hydrogen-Air and
Propane-Air Mixtures
Figure 3 is a plot of ignition energy against fuel concentration for
various mixtures at atmospheric temperature and four different pres-
sures. As the pressure is lowered, the ignition energy increases
rapidly. It also appears that the minimum spark ignition energy occurs
near the stoichiometric ratio of hydrogen and air regardless of pressure.
Suppressing a hydrogen flame is more difficult to achieve than for
most hydrocarbons as indicated by the quenching distances in Figure 4.
Quenching distance is defined as the distance between two parallel walls
which will just permit a flame to pass without cooling it to extinction.
The smaller the quenching distance, the greater the resistance of the
flame to extinction.
The limits of detonation of hydrogen-air mixtures are approximately
18 to 59 percent hydrogen by volume. These detonation limits are of
concern where possible confined conditions or strong detonating ignition
sources exist. Experiments with hydrogen indicate that even partial
confinement such as that produced by three vertical wails (roof and one
side absent) is sufficient to produce a detonation if mixtures within the
detonation limits are ignited. 4 Every effort should be made to avoid
even partial confinement, particulariy where large quantities of hydro-
gen are involved.
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Figure 3. Spark Ignition Energies for Hydrogen-Air Mixtures at
Various Pressures
The possibility of detonation in free space was studied by Cassutt,
Maddocks, and Sawyer. 5 These investigators found that near-
stoichiometric mixtures containing 32 percent hydrogen could propagate
three-dimensional shock waves in free space if a sufficiently strong
initiating source were available. One of the potential hazards associated
with detonations in free space is the gross spillage of liquid hydrogen.
For example, the contents of a 60,000-pound storage tank would pro-
duce 2, i00,000 pounds of detonable mixture if mixed with air in
stoichiometric proportions.
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Figure 4. Quenching Distance for Hydrogen and Propane
A number of tests were carried out in which five- and eight-foot
diameter latex balloons were filled with mixtures of hydrogen and air
and initiated at the center with explosive and flame sources, hot wires,
or sparks. A minimum initiating source of two grams of pentolite was
required for full explosive yield. Use of a blasting cap initiator, which
is approximately one-half gram of explosive, reduced the yield 95 per-
cent, while flame sources and hot wires gave only combustion of the
gases with no measurable pressures. It was concluded that the detona-
tion of a hydrogen-air mixture in free space is possible only if a
suitable mixture ratio and a sufficiently strong initiating source are
present. Since the probability of these co_ditions occurring is remote,
the chance of detonating a large mass of hydr¢)gen in free space is quite
IOW.
In summary, liquid hydrogen does not normally present an explosive
hazard when it evaporates and mixes with air in an unconfined space.
The explosive hazard exists when the mixture is confined, partially
confined, or ignited with a shock source initiator such as TNT.
2. Influence of Pressure and Temperature on limits
Figure 5 shows various results obtained for the limits of
hydrogen in air under pressures greater than atmospheric. The differ-
ences are not so great as they may appear to be at first sight, except
for lower-limit mixtures at pressures of one to five atmospheres, and
these may be ascribed to different interpretations of experimental
results rather than to the experiments themselves. The criterion was
100 percent combustion for the series indicated in the figure by small
circles but only 80 percent for the series represented by the unbroken
line. In general, it appears that the limits are at first narrowed by
increase of pressure above atmospheric but at higher pressures are
steadily widened.
Reduced pressure affected the lower limit as follows: In a closed
glass tube six centimeters in diameter and 120 centimeters in length,
with downward propagation of flame, at one atmosphere the lower limit
was 9. 35 percent and at one-half atmosphere, i0. 6 percent, s Experi-
ments in a burette indicated the existence of a small lowering of the
lower limit between approximately 500 and ZOO millimeters pressure
followed by a rapid rise between Z00 and 100 millimeters. 7 Other experi-
ments in narrow tubes (8, 16, and 25 millimeter diameter), with upward
propagation of flame, showed no great change in the limits until the
pressure was below approximately 300 millimeters. When the range
narrowed until below 50 millimeters, no mixture propagated flame. 8
Table I and Figure 6 give some resuits obtained in a closed tube
Z. 5 centimeters in diameter and 150 centimeters in length, with down-
ward propagation of flame. 9 The flame temperature necessary to
insure propagation of flame downward is much above the ignition tem-
perature of hydrogen in air, 585 ° C. Moreover, increase in initial
temperature of the mixture does not cause the calculated flame tem-
perature of the mixture to fall toward the ignition temperature but has
the opposite effect for lower-limit mixtures.
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Table I. Influence of Temperature on the Limits of Flammability of
Hydrogen in Air, Downward Propagation of Flame
Temperature, °C
17±3
5O
I00
150
200
250
300
350
400
Limits of Flamma-
bility, Percent
Hydrogen
HigherLower
9.4
9.2
8.8
8.3
7.9
7.5
7. I
6.7
6.3
71.5
73.5
76.0
79.0
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Calculated Flame
Temperatures, °C
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Section III. IGNITION OF FLAMMABLE MIXTURES
The presence of a flammable or explosive mixture does not consti-
tute a hazard by itself, unless the possibility of a spark or other
initiating source also exists. Three general types of initiating sources
can be considered potentially hazardous: electrical sources, hot
surfaces, and hot gases.
1. Electrical Sources
a. Electrostatic Sparks
Arthur D. Little 1° conducted studies which lead to the
conclusion that significant electrostatic charges can be generated in
well-grounded systems during storage and handling of liquid hydrogen.
Because of the extremely low electrical conductivity of hydrogen, these
charges persist over long periods of time in storage. The relaxation
time for the liquid is at least one thousand times that of jet fuels.
The most serious condition for buildup of electrostatic charges
would exist during two-phase flow in transfer operations. The circum-
stances wouid be particularly critical during initial cooldown of the
system when both phases are present in the connecting pipelines.
Test results established that static charge concentrations generated
by the liquid are much less severe since, in the streaming test apparatus,
the voItages measured during liquid flow were less than 10 percent of
those recorded during periods of two-phase flow. The results do not
prove whether charges were built up during the transfer of gaseous
hydrogen, because in all tests two-phase flow was involved in vaporizing
the liquid. However, theory suggests that no gas will generate signifi-
cant electrostatic charges unless liquid or solid particles are entrained.
The level of charge buiidup in all tests was insufficient to cause
spark ignition. The maximum field strength generated by flow through
pipelines was in the order of 10 volts per centimeter. The breakdown
potential of hydrogen, however, is normally 17, 500 volts per centimeter.
Although under some conditions sparks or corona discharges of suffi-
cient energy for ignition could be produced at lower field strengths than
17,500 volts per centimeter, those measured in the liquid hydrogen tests
are less by three orders of magnitude. It should be emphasized, on the
other hand, that more critical flow conditions than produced in the tests
might lead to greater charge generation and that impingement of charged
hydrogen upon an electrically insulated accumulator could give poten-
tials that would be dangerous. Therefore, positive and reliable ground-
ing of all components is needed in hydrogen transfer systems.
b. Break Sparks 11
When an electrical switch is opened or when a current-
carrying wire is broken mechanically, an arc may occur between the
separating conductors and ignition may develop if the break occurs
within a combustible gas mixture. Most of the electrical energy is
converted to heat while the separating conductors are still very close
together. Therefore, the ignition resembles electrostatic spark
ignition at very short values of gap length and the requisite energy is
in the range of milIijoules rather than fractions of a millijoule. Because
of the inductance of the system and because the wires represent heat
sinks of rather undetermined magnitude, the exact energy dissipated
within the gap cannot be specified precisely.
2. Hot Surfaces l!
a. Small Wires
If the heating current occurs as a pulse of short duration
and if the heated wire is sufficiently fine, the problem of ignition or
nonignition reduces to one of energy release as in other localized
sources. In most practical problems the duration of heating is fairly
long (measured in seconds rather than microseconds) and the heated
wire is nornqally considered to be a hot surface.
b. Large Surfaces
The temperature required to ignite a large volume of a
flammable mixture has been found to decrease with increase in wire
diameter. This general behavior is illustrated in Figure 7. Since a
heated wire sets up convection currents in a flammable gas situated in
a gravitational field, the contact time between the heated surface and a
small adjacent volume of gas is limited. However, increasing the wire
diameter tends to increase the contact time and, therefore, decrease
the surface temperature required for ignition. An additional decrease
in the surface temperature is obtained when the flammable mixture is
surrounded with a relatively large heated container in place of the
heated wire or when the gravitational field strength is reduced, thereby
increasing the contact time between the flammable mixture and the
heated surface.
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Figure 7. Effect of Wire Diameter on the Ignition Temperature of a
Flammable Mixture
3. Hot Gases in the Absence of Surfaces 11
Pilot flames of sufficiently small size may be treated as point
sources, and the critical energy flux is predictable from spark ignition
data. However, in most cases, pilot flames are extended sources and
the critical factor for ignition is the temperature of their combustion
products.
Ignition by streams of hot gases has been a specialized subject
developed mainly in connection with hazards of flammable atmospheres
in coal mines and in the design of engines wherein flames may be
stabilized by recirculating combustion products.
II
Section IV. DETECTION OF FIRE AND EXPLOSION HAZARDS
Parametric s, Incorporated, 12,13developed a hazardous gas
detector which is capable of detecting not only hydrogen, but also
fluorine, chlorine trifluoride, and oxygen difluoride. The system
involves the techniques of radiochemical exchange using kryptonates, la
A kryptonated solid undergoing a chemical reaction releases krypton-85
because of the chemicaI destruction of the surface layers. The amount
of activity released is proportional to the agent with which the krypton-
ated solid is reacting. Conceivably any solid material may be selected
which displays good reaction characteristics with the constituent to be
detected and its radiokrypton homolog applied as the means of measure-
ment. Almost any reaction can be made to release radiokrypton as an
easily counted gas.
The fabricated model based on this technique was shown to be
capable of producing a reliable warning indication when concentrations
of hydrogen exceed 0. 5 or 1. 0 percent. The instrument developed under
this program is relatively small and compact, simple to operate, and
reliable. Nevertheless, recent advances in the preparation of krypton-
ated sensors would allow still further simplifications in the design with
consequent decrease in size and weight, increase in reliability, and
reduction in maintenance requirements.
The experimental apparatus devised for the investigation of
kryptonated sources as possible detection systems for hydrogen is
shown in Figure 8. The essential element of this system is the reaction
vessel. The vessel is a quartz oven with a shelf for mounting the
source and an aluminum window for counting the source with the Geiger
tube. The vessel can be maintained at any temperature by controlling
the power through nichrome heating coils encompassing the vessel. The
temperature of the source can be constantly monitored by means of a
thermocouple placed on the shelf adjacent to the source.
Various concentrations of hydrogen were passed over a kryptonated
source. The hydrogen concentration was varied by diluting one-percent
hydrogen in nitrogen mixture with pure nitrogen or air. The loss in
activity of the source was determined by means of the Geiger tube and
recorded. The loss in activity was determined at known concentrations
of hydrogen and known source temperatures.
Analytical grade copper oxide wire was kryptonated using the high
pressure, high temperature technique. Approximately three milligrams
of copper oxide (CuO) wire was placed on the shelf of the reaction vessel.
12
The reaction vessel was heated to a constant temperature while pure
nitrogen was passed over the source. The rate of decrease of the
source was determined using a Geiger tube as a detector. The readout
mechanism consisted ofanR. E.A.C. Model H580 ratemeter and a
Leeds and Northrup Model S recorder. During the heating cycle,
kryptonated CuO degasses until a constant temperature is reached.
Once the source has been stabilized at a constant temperature, activity
will be released only if a chemical or physical reaction at the surface
occurs. Thus by passing hydrogen over a kryptonated copper oxide
source maintained at a constant temperature, reduction will occur
with a resultant decrease in the source activity.
CDQ[
H2N 2 N 2
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Figure 8. Hydrogen Detection System
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A series of runs using kryptonated copper oxide under varying
conditions of temperature and hydrogen concentration were made. It
was found that as the hydrogen concentration changes, the rate of
decrease of the source changes. This rate of decrease can be used as
a measure of the hydrogen concentration. The percentage change per
minute at any specific concentration can be found by normalizing the
13
count rate and determining the percentage loss in t minutes. This
calculation is shown in T_ble II. The source, S, in this table is
expressed in counts per minute (cpm).
Table II. Response of Kryptonated Copper Oxide to Hydrogen
%
H a Concen-
tration
0.17
0.33
0. 49
1.00
S o
cpm at
t=0
44xl 03
38x103
25xl 03
16. 5xlO 3
S
cpm at
t
38x103
25x103
16. 5xl 03
5. lxlO 3
SI
ml
SoJt= 0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
u ,
_o It
O. 863
0. 657
0. 660
0. 309
t
(rain.)
Z1
16
9
9
d(S/So)
dt
% los s/min,
0.65Z
Z. 14
3.75
7.68
The rate of reduction is in general a function of temperature and
hydrogen pressure. It can be expected that the higher the temperature
and concentration the faster the rate of reaction. Since the rate of
reaction is directly proportional to the percentage decrease in activity
per minute of a kryptonated oxide, this value can be expected also to
increase with increasing temperature and hydrogen concentration.
Figure 9 is a plot of the percentage in activity lost per minute from a
kryptonated CuO source at 600 ° and 650 ° C. At both temperatures the
slope of the line is constant and equal to 3/2, indicating that the percent
decrease is proportional to the 3/Z power of the hydrogen concentration.
This can be mathematically written as
d(S/So) : K[Hz]3/z
dt
where K is a function of the temperature.
Figure 10 is a plot of the rate of decrease of the source versus the
reciprocal temperature on semilog paper. This plot shows an Arrhenius
temperature dependency, i.e. , In d(S/So)/dt is linear with I/T. From
the Arrhenius temperature dependency, it is possible to derive an
equation describing the reduction process. From Figure I0,
in d(S/So)/dt is proportional to -B/T where B is a constant dependent
on the activation energy, i.e. , B=E/R, E is the energy of activation,
and R is the gas-law constant.
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Then,
d(S/So)
dt
_ _Ce-E/RT
I 13/z and at any constant concentration iswhere C is a function of H a
constant, i.e., C =k IHzl _/z. The complete equation then is
dt 2 e
From the slope of the Arrhenius plot E/R is found to be 9. 05 x 103 °K,
and hence E = 18. 1 kilocalories. The final equation then is
15
d(S/So) k H 2
dt
e-18. 1 k cal/RT
At 600 ° C, k = 1. 7 x 105% losslminll%HJ 31a[ ! determined where
JH ln] = O, i.e., when [Hal = 1%. This equation can be used to predictt ,
th percent of activity loss from a kryptonated copper oxide source at
any hydrogen concentration and source temperature.
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The results indicated in the preceding paragraphs were obtained
with hydrogen diluted with nitrogen. When hydrogen was diluted with
air, the results were negative. There was no release of activity when
a hydrogen-air mixture was passed over kryptonated copper oxide at
any temperature. It is apparent that the hydrogen must be reacting
16
Table Ill. Performance Characteristics
Characteristic
A. Ambient Pressure
B. Ambient Temper-
ature
Design
Specification
760 mm to
10 -8 mm of Hg
+60 to - 150 °
Celsius
Measured Characteristic
Non-operating:
760 mm Hg to 10 -6 rnn_ Hg; no
damage or other adverse effects
10 -6 mm Hg to 10 -8 mm Hg;
not measured. No adverse
effects expected.
Ope rating:
760 mm Hg to 10 -3 mm Hg;
performance as specified below
No degradation due to pressure.
10 -3 mm Hg to 10 -6 n-_rn Hg; no
useful performance with present
sensor elements. No equipment
degradation due to attempted
operation at low pressure.
10 -6 mm Hg to 10 -8 rnm Hg;
not measured. No adverse
effects expected.
Non-operating:
-Z0°C to 75°C; no damage.
-150°C to -g0°C; not tested.
No adverse effects expected.
Operating:
-20°C to +75°C; normal opera-
tion.
-150°C to -Z0°C; not tested.
Possible difficulty of dc-dc
converter start after cold soak
at low temperature. Once
started, no difficulties antici-
pated for vacuun_ environn_ent.
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with oxygen on the surface of the copper oxide to form water vapor. In
this instance no reduction of the oxide occurs, and hence no loss in
activity is observed. Kryptonated copper oxide can be used as a
hydrogen detector only in an atmosphere void of oxygen. However, it
was discovered that a one-to-one mixture of kryptonated platinum
oxide (PtO z) and inert molybdenum trioxide (MoO 3) gives excellent
sensitivity with hydrogen in an air atmosphere. It is believed that the
n_echanism is one of diffusion of the hydrogen through the MoO 3 and
into the PtO 2, where reduction occurs. The MoO 3 acts as a coating,
which inhibits the reaction of hydrogen with oxygen, allowing the
hydrogen to diffuse through its surface.
Several other materials were investigated by Parametrics,
Incorporated 14 for their sensitivity in the detection of hydrogen in air.
The optimum host material was found to be a 50:50 mixture of kryp-
tonated platinum dioxide and aluminum oxide. The sensitivity obtained
was 125 percent per minute for a one-percent hydrogen concentration
at the maximum experimental temperature of 435 ° C.
The Bendix Corporation, Is Research Laboratories Division,
Southfield, Michigan,_', = designed a compact miniature area hydrogen
detector suitable for use in the unpressurized sections of large rocket
booster and sustainer stages. The hydrogen sensor element consists
of a thin palladium film deposited on a gas substrate. When exposed to
hydrogen gas, the electrical resistance value of the element increases.
The magnitude of the change is dependent upon several factors, such as
hydrogen partial pressure, the film temperature, and the film resis-
tance. An effort was made to design this detector to minimize the
effect of these factors except the hydrogen partial pressure. Thus, a
change in the sensor element electrical resistance is directly attribut-
able to the hydrogen partial pressure at the surface of the element. The
characteristics of this detection system are summarized in Table III.
_':'_Thiswork was conducted for the Georg_ C. Marshall Space Flight
Center, Huntsville, Alabama, under Contract No. NAS8-5282.
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Table III. (Continued)
Design
Characteristic Specification Measured Characteristic
C. Vibration
D. Sensitivity
E. Accuracy
0-2000 cps; 35 g's
Randon_ noise, 15
minutes in each of
Not tested.
Difficulties not expected for
electronic control assenlbly.
F. Range
G. Output Signal
H. Response Time
three mutually
perpendicular
planes
Ten parts per
million of
hydrogen in air
Five percent of
actual gas con-
centration
Ten parts per
million to 5000
parts per million
(wide range is
desirable)
Analog output
proportional to
quantity of hydro-
gen (0-5 volts dc
desired)
500 milliseconds
or better
Possibility of blower motor
bearing failure in sensor
assembly.
Sensor element is responsive
to hydrogen partial pressure
not concentration ratio. Sen-
sitivity limit is about 10 -3
Torr. Hydrogen concentration
limit is about one part per
million in non-oxidizing gases
at STP, 1000 parts per mil-
lion in air at STP.
Ten percent of indicated
hydrogen pressure plus oxy-
gen offset, which is equivalent
to between 0. 01% and 0. 5% of
oxygen pressure.
Equipment range set for one
part per million to 5000 parts
per million at STP. (Essen-
tially a square root scale to
extend response indication.)
Zero-5 volts dc with ground
system isolation. D-C signal
is proportional to hydrogen
pressure raised to the 0. 53
power; desired for extended
range.
500 milliseconds or slower;
response time, (0-i0%), is
_nversely proportional to
square root of hydrogen
pressure.
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Characteristics
I. Stability
Table III. (Continued)
J. Power
Available
K. Physical
Dimensions
L. Weight
Design
Specification Measured Characteristic
The system must
be capable of con-
tinuous operation
and must maintain
calibration curve
to ± 1°70 for eight
hours without
adjustment
28 volts dc
The latest minia-
turization tech-
niques should be
used to produce
a compact, explo-
sion proof package
The total system
weight should not
exceed 3 lb
The equipment is capable of
continuous operation and will
typically remain calibrated to
within +20% for eight hours
with present film elements.
Requires 28 + 5 volts dc.
Control assembly is a 4 in. x
2. 5 in. x 3 in. box on a 3.00
in. x 5. 31 in. base. Sensor
assembly is 1.6 in. x 1.0 in. x
1. 0 in. mounted on a 1.00 in.
x 2.24 in. base. Interconnect-
ing cable is 1/2 in. diameter
5 ft long. Terminal board
construction is employed with
all hard wiring connections.
Entire control assembly is
internally enclosed in silicone
foam re sin.
The system weight, for the
delivered sensors, each con-
taining a control assembly,
sensor assembly, and inter-
connecting cable, are as
follows:
SN 101 2 lbs 4. 5 oz
SN 102 Z lbs 6. 75 oz
SN 103 2 lbs 7. 75 oz
2O
Table Ill. (Concluded)
Design
Characteristic Specification Measured Characteristic
M. Detector
Specificity
The sensor shall
respond to any
other gas so that
The measured response to
saturated vapors at STP were
obtained for the following
output from the
sensor will be an
indication of the
presence of
hydrogen
materials:
Acetone No effect
Benzene No effect
Ethyl Alcohol No effect
Freon, P. C. No effect
Methyl Alco- No effect
hol
RPI Fuel No effect
Toluene No effect
Water No effect
Argon Little effect
Helium No effect
Nitrogen No effect
Oxygen Interfe fence
Thiokol Chemical Corporation, 16 Reaction Motors Division,
Denville, New Jersey,:: -"investigated the possibility of detecting
hydrogen-air fires and explosions in aerospace vehicles by measuring
the absolute value of radiant intensity over the oxygen-hydrogen (OH)
bands of the ultraviolet and the water bands in the infrared. A sur-
prising result was the increase in OH radiant intensity with decreasing
pressure. Diffusion flame variables were hydrogen flow rate, port
dian_eter, and pressure from 760 to less than 30 mn_ Hg. For explo-
sions, mixture ratio as well as pressure were varied; the rates of
increase of emission and pressure after ignition were measured to
determine detection lead time. Results where possible are presented
as fundamental quantities that can be applied with reasonable rigor to a
variety of design situations. Detection based upon nlonitoring OH
radiation is recommended over other properties such as infrared {IR)
radiation, ionization, temperature rise, or pressure rise. The con-
clusions reached on the basis of this study are as follows:
_:_This work was conducted under Air Force Contract No.
AF 33(657)-8969 for the Air Force Systems Co_l_mand, Wright-
Patterson Air ]£orce Base, Ohio.
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l) In general, the monitoring of emitted radiation from the
hydrogen-air flame is the best basis for detection of fires and explo-
sions under all operating conditions for reasons of sensitivity, detection
from a distance within a solid angle of view, promptness of detection,
and simplicity of equipment.
2) Monitoring the ultraviolet (UV) eli emission from hydrogen-
air flames is intrinsically the best way to detect hydrogen-air flames.
Very snlall flames of a one cubic centimeter hydrogen consumption
rate can be detected, and for any constant hydrogen consumption rate
the radiant intensity increases as pressure decreases.
3) The water band IR en_ission is not a suitable property for
hydrogen-air flame detection, because the radiant intensity decreases
with pressure below 60 mm Hg as the radiation is purely thermal and
flame ten_perature decreases with pressure.
_) In the case of explosions, the OH (UV) emission is the best
property for detection, before vessel pressure rise to a dangerous
level, over the complete range of mixture ratios tested and at all
pressures where explosions may yield a dangerous pressure rise.
Marginal cases exist for n_ixtures near the rich limit (70% hydrogen)
where OH concentrations are low and the radiation levels and rates of
rise are unusually snlall.
5) Detection of explosions through the water (IR) emission is, in
one sense, easier than with the OH emission, insofar as the n_arginal
rich n_ixture cases are not found. The susceptibility, however, of
interference fronl background due to a warm environn_ent and from
atn_ospheric and condensate absorption render the IR approach less
reliable overall than the UV.
6) A flame at one atmosphere pressure represents a more
critical detection problem than at reduced pressures, because of the
pressure dependence of radiant intensity and minimum flame size.
7) An explosion at one atmosphere of a near-stoichion_etric
hydrogen-air mixture is the most critical detection problem, because
such an explosion yields the highest rate of absolute pressure rise and,
thus, the minimum lead time between radiation detection and some
arbitrary absolute pressure rise. However, even in these cases, a
conservative lead time of about 10 milliseconds is available for a five-
foot explosion propagation path.
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8) The time rate of pressure rise in a compartment caused by
exploding a given mixture at a given initial pressure varies with com-
partment geometry; for any given geometry, it is nearly inversely
proportional to linear compartment dimension except during the final
stages of propagation.
9) Heat abstraction from the reaction zone will decrease radiant
intensity levels.
lO) In any real situation, the limits of detectability of fires and
explosions and the detection lead time for explosions depend upon
environmental design factors such as heat sink effects, geometry, and
distance of detector from the flame or ignition, and upon detection
system design factors such as detector threshold, irradiance level
criteria for detection, and definition of hazardous conditions. The
effect of many of these factors can be extrapolated from the data
reported.
11) Spectral distribution in the UV has shown small variations with
pressure which, however, are not significant with regard to the detec-
tion problem,
12) Solar radiation in the UV becomes an increasing interference
with altitude unless the compartment in question is closed or, if vented,
light shielding of detectors is provided.
The Bureau of Mines,17'18'19'z°'z1pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, is
reviewing existing hydrogen safety practices in an effort to establish
acceptable standard practices. The evaluation of several hydrogen
detectors is a part of this review. The evaluation of hydrogen detec-
tors is continuing, and some results appear in the quarterly reports
published by the Bureau of Mines. Progress Report No. 6 for the
period from April 1 to June 30, 1965, was the last report available at
the time of this writing, zl
A brief description of the units tested and, where possible, the
results obtained are listed below. Response times were determined by
exposing each detector head to a series of uniform hydrogen-air
mixtures contained in a vertical two-inch diameter pipe. This pipe
was equipped with gas inlet and outlet ports and a horizontal sliding
plate that was actuated by a rapidly acting solenoid. The detector
heads were placed in a second two-inch pipe located in, mediately above
the horizontal plate. In practice, the horizontal sliding plate was
closed and the lower chamber filled with a hydrogen-air mixture at a
flow rate of 100 craB/see. The response tinge was taken to be the time
Z3
interval between the instant the solenoid was actuated and the instant
the signal response reached a value of approximately two-thirds of the
maximum.
Recovery times were also determined in the above described
apparatus. Here, the sliding plate was removed and a hydrogen-air
mixture passed through the two-inch pipe. The recovery time was
taken to be the time required for a drop of approximately two-thirds
in the signal response (i.e., to about one-third of the maximum)
following removal of the sensing head from the two-inch pipe.
1) Unit I: 19 This instrument utilizes a sensing head remote from
the analyzer system. A sample of the surrounding atmosphere is
drawn by diffusion and convection through a porous cylindrical element
containing two heated filaments. One filament is treated with a cata-
lytic coating to effect a change in the resistance when the sample con-
tains combustible gas. This change in resistance unbalances a bridge
circuit in proportion to the amount of combustible gas in the sample
(Table IV).
Table IV. Response and Recovery Times for Hydrogen Detectors
that Sample by Diffusion
llydrogen Concentration
Volume (%)
1.0
2.0
i0.0
25.0
50.0
2.0
I0.0
50.0
Response Time
Unit I
2.0 I.
1.5 1.
1.4 1.
0.8
0.6 1.
R ecove ry
1.0 1.
2.
1Z.
(Jnit IA
8
4
4
2
Time
0
l
7
(sec)
Unit II
2.4
2.3
I.i
0.7
0.6
(sec)
1.7
2) Unit IA:19 The analyzer assembly of this unit is of the same
type as in Unit I, but the sensing element is reportedly designed for
detection of hydrogen in the presence of inert gases (Table IV).
3) Unit II "19 This instrument also uses a sensing head remote
from the control and assembly. The head contains four pelletized
se.nsing elements which are exposed to the sample gas by diffusion and
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convection of the ambient atmosphere through a porous disk, Two of
the pellets are treated to produce catalytic burning in the presence of
a combustible gas. The resulting change in resistance of the two
pellets serves to unbalance a bridge circuit which produces the required
signal (Table IV).
4) Unit III:19 This is a portable instrument. The sensing element,
which contains a catalytic filament, is an integral part of the complete
assembly. Samples of the atmosphere are drawn through a probe by
an aspirator bulb.
5) Unit IV: 19 This unit is designed for gas analysis in the labora-
tory. It contains two thermal conductivity cells, which are part of a
bridge circuit. In the experiments conducted by the Bureau of Mines,
the sample gas flowed through one cell and the reference gas (air or
helium) was confined in the other.
6) Unit IVA: 19 This is an experimental unit constructed by the
Bureau of Mines. Its special feature is the thermal conductivity ceils
made from a single metal block bored to contain two 1.5-cubic centi-
meter chambers. Each chamber was fitted with a 1. 5-millimeter
tungsten wire positioned directly in the path of the flowing gas sample.
V 197) Unit : This is a portable optical interferometer containing
two chambers. Samples of the atmosphere are drawn through one
chamber by an aspirator bulb and air (or the standard gas) remains
quiescent in the second (reference) chamber.
8) Unit VI:19 This is a hand-held device designed to detect com-
bustible gas leaks. A self-contained pump aspirates the sample con-
tinuously at about six cubic centimeters per second through a sensing
element where catalytic combustion occurs. The presence of a com-
bustible gas is noted simultaneously by meter response and by the
cut-off of an audible tone signal.
9) Units HD-7 and HD-8: z° Two commercial leak detectors based
on monitoring ultrasonic frequencies resulting from gas escaping from
a small orifice were evaluated. Since the principle behind these instru-
ments permits them to detect sound frequencies of about 40 kilocycles
from any source, they are not sensitive to hydrogen leaks only. Leaks
of any gas, or indeed any source of ultrasound, may produce a
response. For example, instrument HD-7 r_-sponds to sounds pro-
duced by the rustling of paper or rubbing of hands. Such poor discrimi-
nation between sources of sounds limits the unit to the detection of
hydrogen leaks in an otherwise silent environment. The maximum
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distance between leak and instrument, at which range a hydrogen leak
can be detected, was determined by means of hydrogen leaks from a
closed vessel two inches in diameter and I0 inches long. Orifices of
0.001-, 0.003-, and 0.006-inch diameter were located at one end of
the axis of the vessel, which was kept at constant pressure. Orienta-
tion of the orifice was varied so that its axis was aligned with the axis
of detector and facing it (0 degrees), perpendicular to it (90 degrees),
or facing opposite to it (180 degrees). Unit HD-7, designed for direct
aural observation, was modified by connecting a sensitive AC volt-
meter to the audio output. Unit HD-8 had a built-in meter, which was
used. Results of the tests are summarized in Table V. The data
indicate that units HD-7 and HD-8 are potentially useful, especially
for detecting small leaks from orifices pointed at the detectors.2°
I0) Unit HD-9: zl This is a portable unit utilizing a sensing head
connected to the analyzer system by a coiled cable several feet long.
The surrounding atmosphere is sampled by diffusion and convection
through a porous cylindrical element, which acts as a flame arrester.
Two heated filaments within the porous element are balanced in resis-
tance when the gas sample is air. However, since one of the elements
is coated with a catalytic substance, the presence of hydrogen causes
a rise in its temperature resulting in an unbalance in the circuit and,
therefore, a readout proportional to the amount of hydrogen in the
sample.
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il) Unit HD-10: In this portable instrument the sensing element
is an integral part of the complete assembly, and the gas samples are
drawn through a probe by aspiration.
Zl
12) Unit HD-11: This is a console unit with a diffusion head,
similar in operating principle to Unit HD-9. This unit is designed to
operate at a number of stations utilizing a number of nlodules with one
sensing head connected to each n_odule. The units under test consisted
of three sensing heads, three modules, and three sensing elements.
Measurement of the output of the instrument was made with a Ballantine
AC Vacuum Tube Voltmeter (Table VI).
13) Unit HD-12: el This is a console type instrument that samples
by aspiration. The sensing element, containing catalytic filaments is
remote from the rest of the assembly and is enclosed in an explosion-
proof container designed for CIass 1, Group B atmospheres. Samples
of air are drawn through this unit, which is fitted with flame arresters
both at the inlet and outlet ends. The amplifier and control unit are to
be located in a safe area and are designed to indicate percent of lower
explosive limit {LEL) of hydrogen (Table VII). Suitable relays are
incorporated to set alarms and indicate malfunctions.
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Table V. Threshold Distance for Ultrasonically Detected Leaks
Unit
HD- 7,
Orifice
Diameter
0. 001-in.
HD- 7,
Orifice
Diameter
0. 003-in.
HD- 7,
Orifice
Diameter
0. 006-in.
HD- 8,
Orifice
Diameter
0. 003- in.
Orientation
of Leak
o
Pressure,
psig
Flow Rate of
Hydrogen,
cfm x 104
15
5O
100
25
71
180
Threshold
Detection
Distance,
ft
0.08
12
25
90 °
180 °
15
50
I00
15
50
I00
25
71
180
25
71
180
Not
Detected
3
12
Not
Detected
1.5
3.0
0 ° i 71 0. 25
5 130 45
Not
90 ° I 71
Detected
o
90 °
180 °
5
15
30
130
230
420
23
56
230
560
230
30
45
55
0.25
>60
5
15
56O
950
Not
Detected
>60
Not
Detected
12
20
0 ° 1 71 5
5 130 55
90 °
cted
Not
1
Dete
0 30
0 50
7
13
Z3
I
5
15
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Table VI. Unit HD-II Response and Recovery Times
Hydrogen Concentration Response Time Recovery Time
(%) (sec) (sec)
50
15
4
3
2
i
1.4
2.2
2.1
2. i
3.4
10.1
6.4
5.4
4.4
2.9
Table VII. Unit HD-12 Effect of Sample Flow Rates
Hydrogen Concentration Meter Reading(Percent LEL)
(%) 7 ft3/hr 14 ft_/hr 28 ft3/hr
1
2
3
4
18
5O
68
84
Z4
50
70
100
30
60
72
96
Rocketdyne, zz'z3 a division of North American Aviation, Inc., is
investigating the technical aspects of a Saturn Vehicle Fire Detection
System.;:-" The aim of this study is to obtain data on the radiative
characteristics of hydrogen fires and to apply these data to the design
and development of a fire detection system for the upper stages of the
Saturn vehicle. The system must discriminate against false signals
from sunlight and from the rocket engine exhaust plume radiation.
The fire detection systenl under development is composed of three
subsystems. The functional role of each is described briefly.
1) OH Flicker Detector: The basis for this subsystem is twofold.
First, all flames are known to scintillate; hence, the detection of time-
varying radiation provides a measure of discrimination against emitting
or reflecting false signal sources. Second, the OH radical is a short
lived species formed as an intermediate combustion product; hence,
detection of its radiation is indicative of a fire.
<-'This work is being performed under Contract No. NAS8-11656.
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hydrogen concentration will give approximately a six percent change in
the acoustic velocity since the acoustic velocity ratio is a function of
the square root of the inverse ratio of the masses. Such a change is
quite significant since a 40° C temperature change would be required
to create a corresponding differential in velocity. A small acoustic
interferometer could be readily constructed of roughly Z0 wavelengths
in arm lengths where one arm is maintained in a normal atmosphere
and the second arm is in the medium under consideration. A null to
null variation in signal would indicate a one percent hydrogen concen-
tration variation with such an arm length.
The basic mechanism of any acoustic system designed to evaluate
the concentration of a gaseous material (such as hydrogen in a gaseous
medium) may be expressed in the following manner. At any arbitrary
temperature the velocity of sound is specified by the relationship:
v
a Yi RT _7oRT= + (1 - c_)M1 M o
14
(1)
where v = velocity in cm/sec
= the mole fraction of the material under consideration
1-a = the residual mole fraction
R : the universal gas constant 8. 31 x 10 +7 erg
tool wt- 1
°K -1 grin
M1 =
Yi :
T:
for a =
molecular weights of the constituents
the ratios of specific heat of the gases
the absolute temperature at which the velocity is being
measured
O,
V:Vo=\ Mo /
G
Hydrogen has a molecular weight MI -- Z.016 and normal atnaos-
pheric air has a molecular weight M o = 28. 9. For the purpose of this
discussion, the two media may be considered diatomic so that
"_1 : "{o: 7/5. Relationship (1) then may be rewritten as follows:
]1/2+ 1 -1 = the fractional change (z)
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in velocity due to the mole fraction a of hydrogen in air is of the
order
AVvo 2ct M(__T-_ = 6.7a ('¢i= Yo)
(3)
i.e., one percent hydrogen changes the acoustic velocity by 6. 7 percent.
For all normal variations in common potential atmospheric con-
stituents the value of the molecular mass M1 is of the order of Mo, so
that on a practical basis one could consider the velocity variation due
to hydrogen only. To illustrate, let us introduce the velocity variation
due to the known excursion of water vapor concentration, i.e., percent
of atmospheric water vapor 0.2 to 4 percent. Since this is a triatomic
-9
molecule (HzO) "fl = _ and equation (1) may be reduced to:
AVvo __ a2 M[-Mll)'_o'_I 1] = 0.265 a. (3a)
One therefore may expect a fractional velocity change of approxi-
mately one percent for the entire potential vapor density variation in
HzO. This is equivalent to a 0.15 percent variation in hydrogen concen-
tration.
Temperature variations may also be considered on the same basis:
(3b)
Using this relation and assuming a standard temperature of the order
of 300 ° K, one would require about 40 ° C departure from 300 ° K to
create a fractional velocity change equivalent to that induced by one
percent hydrogen concentration in the atmosphere.
One would be quite satisfied with these results if helium were not
used as a flushing agent. This is the major conceivable material
capable of causing difficulty for acoustic systems. To illustrate, one
again uses equation 3a. For a monatomic gas Y1 = 5/3 and the value
of the fractional velocity change becomes
3Z
4) Kryptonate quenching 12
5) Molecular resonance detection of: (a) products of major and
minor atmospheric constituents with hydrogen, and(b} products of
inhibitor reactions with hydrogen
6} Mass spectroscopy
7} Chromatography
8) Quenching of resonance radiation
9) Palladium tube sieve
10) Easter excited Raman spectra
ll) Gamma and X- ray techniques
12) Palladium resistor
13) Fuel cell system (hydrogen electrode)
14} Acoustic techniques
15) Catalysis
as and itA brief discussion of these systems appears in the study,
was concluded that the detection of gaseous hydrogen is best accom-
plished by one, or a combination, of the following systems:
'I) Acoustic (partial volume sensing by gas transport phenomena)
2) K ryptonate Iz
3) Electrochemical (point sensing by fuel cell action)
The system involving the use of kryptonated solids is discussed
elsewhere in this report. The other two techniques are reviewed
below:
First, the electrochemical system using the fuel cell hydrogen
detector is discussed. Although there are many electrochenlical sys-
tems, only those cells operable at (or near) room temperature are of
potential usefulness for hydrogen detection. These room-ten_perature
cell systems, at present, may be subject to partial "drowning" in the
atmospheric water vapor or in their own generated water. Future
research is needed to render this technique feasible for practical
hydrogen detection.
Second, the acoustic system utilizing acoustic absorption and
velocity methods is discussed. If one considers the acoustic velocity
of hydrogen relative to that of air, one observes that a one percent
3O
2) Sun Discriminator: Since this system responds only to time-
varying radiation, the sun is a possible false signal source only when
the solar radiation is modulated by a vibrating missile member or by
the atmosphere. The technique for discrimination against sunlight is
the two-color method, which is basically the detection of the amplitude
versus wavelength envelope by a two point (wavelengths) approximation.
3) Plume Discriminator: The most promising approach for plume
discrimination is with a two-frequency technique. With this technique,
the amplitude versus frequency curve of the J-2 plume radiation modu-
lation is approximated by two frequencies. If necessary, three or
more frequencies are used to improve the "curve fit." The method is
analogous to the two-color method used for solar discrimination.
The Radio Corporation of America z4 advanced the concept for a
leak detection technique based on the addition of a radioactive contami-
nant, tritium-3, to the source material and, subsequently, detection
of the leading tritium-3 with a solid-state detector.
Tritium-3 (H 3) decays with a half-life of 12. 3 years by emission
of a beta particle of 0. 0180 million electron volt (mev} energy to the
stable helium-3. Concentrations as low as one part tritium-3 in 1016
parts of ordinary hydrogen can be detected. The biological hazards
from tritium are negligible, while very light shielding is required to
screen out the 0.0180 mev beta particles.
A solid-state detector is available with an active layer of one
micron, which is about half the thickness needed to stop the mev beta
particle. If an aperture and location are selected so that about five
percent of the beta particles in a cubic centimeter of gas interact with
the detector and the internal detector mechanism exhibits a five percent
efficiency, 2.25 x 103 pulses per second from the detector would be
observed for a cubic centimeter of hydrogen leaking from the storage
tank through a seal. The background radiation level from natural
radioactivity was found to be insignificant.
Simmonds Precision Products, as Inc., Tarrytown, New York,
conducted a feasibility study of a hazard evaluation system for hydrogen
for the George C. Marshall Space Flight Center. Considered in this
study were the following hydrogen detection systems:
1) Ultraviolet detection
2) Magnetic resonance spectroscopy
3) Microwave detection
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- I5/3) 1]
v o - 2 t 4(7/5) -] = 3.81ct .
(3c)
It therefore requires only approximately 1.8 percent helium concentra-
tion to produce a fractional velocity change equivalent to that induced by
one percent hydrogen.
An estimate of the fractional velocity change due to departure
from the ideal behavior of the gas in terms of a variation in the ambient
pressure may be obtained by following the technique used by
G Z6, Z7
reenspan.
¥ (1 + 6)
R T._ 1/2
Vo = o Mo----/
(4)
where 6 is a pressure dependent correction. This may be reduced to
the form we are considering:
Av _ 1 + 61 1 - 61 - 60 (3d)
v o 1 + 6 o 1 + 6 0
Values of 6 have been computed by Greenspan for some of the
common gases. Using the values for air and assuming a pressure
excursion from 760 millimeters to 0 millimeter, 81 = o and
Av
8 o = 3. 74 x 10-4; one may therefore predict - -0. 04 percent for
VO
extreme pressure variations in the velocity of sound.
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Section V, SUPPRESSION OF HYDROGEN FIRES AND EXPLOSIONS
An effective detonation inhibitor is defined as one which increases
the ignition energy requirements for detonation in a particular system.
Consequently, it is only necessary to determine the ignition energy
requirements for inhibited hydrogen-oxygen mixtures in order to
quantitatively evaluate the effectiveness of a particuIar inhibitor.
Experiments were conducted by the Bureau of Mines 28 in a 30-
centimeter diameter steel sphere equipped with a means of admitting
the desired gas mixtures and recording the explosion pressure at the
wall. An expioding wire was used as the ignition source and a piezo-
electric transducer was used to record the pressure. The energy for
the ignition wire was derived from a charged condenser. In these
experiments, the minimum stored energy required for initiating deto-
nation was determined to about ±5 percent for the majority of the runs.
Figure ll shows the results of this study for a stoichiometric hydrogen-
oxygen mixture containing various percentages of the inhibitors methane,
methyl chloride, Freon 13B1 (bromotrifluoromethane), Freon 114B2
(1, 2-dibromotetrafluoroethane), nitrogen, oxygen, and hydrogen. A
similar curve labeIed vacuum shows the effect of reduced pressures on
the ignition energy requirements; the abscissa in this case is the
percent reduction in pressure. The figure shows that methane and
methyl chloride are the best inhibitors of the materials tested.
The Atlantic Research Corporation, z9 Alexandria, Virginia,
studied the suppression of detonation of gaseous hydrogen-oxygen
mixtures.".' Quantitative data were obtained on substances known to
inhibit the high-temperature reaction between hydrogen and oxygen.
Complete, three-component hydrogen-air-inhibitor diagrams were con-
structed for nitrogen, methane, bromine, and methyl bromide. These
diagrams are shown in Figures 12 through 15. Of these inhibitors,
only nitrogen and methyl bromide suppress flammability in aI1 hydrogen-
air mixtures. The minimum percentages of carbon dioxide, ethyl
bromide, dichlorodifluoromethane, and carbon tetrachloride required
to suppress the flammability for all hydrogen-air-additive mixtures
were found from the literature to be 56, 8, less than 30, and 70,
respectively.
':_This work was conducted for the Air Force Systems Command,
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, under Air Force Contract
AF 33(616)-8110.
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Figure 11. Minimum Stored Ignition Energies Required for Inhibition
of Detonation of Stoichiometric Hydrogen-Oxygen Mixtures as a
Function of Inhibitor Concentration (Volume Percent)
The Atlantic Research Corporation also studied the initiating
energy required to produce detonation in gaseous hydrogen-oxygen
mixtures. A total of ten additives (nitrogen, methane, methyl chlo-
ride, methyl bromide, methyI iodide, carbon tetrachloride, bromine,
iron pentacarbonyl, tetramethyl lead, and water) were evaluated
individually as detonation suppressants. Of these additives, methane
and methyl chloride had an appreciable inhibiting effect. Iron penta-
carbonyl was the best inhibitor. When 2.2 percent of this additive was
employed, a detonation couId not be initiated with 47 joules, four times
the normal initiating energy. Although halogen-containing compounds
have been reported to be fairly efficient flame inhibitors, they did not,
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in general, appear to inhibit initiation of detonation. The three bromine-
containing inhibitors (Brz, HBr, and CH3Br ) were about as effective as
nitrogen. Methyl iodide was intermediate between the bromide and the
chloride. Carbon tetrachloride, on the other hand, was found to be quite
an effective sensitizer.
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Figure 12. Flammability Limits: Hydrogen-Air-Nitrogen System
AIR
The effect of several inhibitors on hydrogen-air flame speeds was
studied.",'-by Miller, Evers, and Skinner. 30 The measurements obtained
by these investigators should be accurate within ±i0 percent. The con-
centrations of gas mixtures are expressed as the equivalence ratio,
which is defined as follows:
::_This study was sponsored by the Flight Accessories Laboratory,
Aeronautical Systems Division, United States Air Force, under Contract
AF 33(616)-7757.
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Equivalence ratio =
actual hydrogen-air ratio
stoichiometric hydrogen-air ratio
An equivalence ratio of 1. 0 corresponds to a stoichiometric mixture,
that is, two parts hydrogen to one part oxygen. Since air contains 21
percent oxygen, the equivalence ratio of hydrogen-air mixtures can be
given by
equivalence ratio = partial pressure of hydrogen
0.42 x partial pressure of air
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Hydrogen-Air-Bromine System
All experiments were carried out at one atmosphere pressure,
and ideal behavior of the gases was assumed. Description of the
experimental apparatus can be found in the study by Miller, Evers,
and Skinner. 3° Although the effects of small amounts of 80 compounds
(gases and vaporized liquids) on the flame speed were investigated,
only the most promising ones are summarized here.
Figure 16 shows the results of flame speed versus equivalence
ratio for six inhibitors. The concentration of the inhibitor was 0. 5
percent by volume in each case. Flame speed was found to be maxi-
mum at an equivalence ratio of approximately 1.75.
Table VIII lists flame speeds for several inhibitors and compares
them with flame speed when using no inhibitor in which case the flame
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speed was 300 centimeters per second. The gas mixture in this case
consisted of an equivalence ratio of I. 75 (42.4 parts by volume hydrogen
and 57. 6 parts by volume air) and Z parts by volume inhibitor. The
initial gas temperature was 25 ° C.
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Flammability Limits:, Hydrogen-Air-Methyl Bromide
To determine the effect of hydrogen-air ratios on flame inhibition,
a series of experiments was performed at different equivalence ratios,
using several of the better inhibitors. Figure 17 shows this effect for
methane at Z5 ° C. Most of the inhibitors are more effective in rich
than in lean mixtures.
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Figure 16. Flame Speed Versus Equivalence Ratio
Table VIII. Effect of Inhibitors on Flame Speed
Inhibitor
1,3-Butadiene
n -Butane
Dibromotetrafluorethane
Ethyl chloride
Ethylene
1, 1 -Difluorethane
Methane
Methyl bromide
Methyl chloride
1, l -Difluorethylene
Vinyl chloride
None
Flame Speed
cm/sec
27
46
54
8O
100
135
144
154
199
202
Z30
3OO
4O
300
I
5
CURVE EOUIVALENCE RATIO
I 0.512
2 O. 946
3 1.75
4 3.24
5 6.00
I I /
0 I 2 3 4
Figure 17.
0/0 METHANE ADDED
Flame Speeds of Hydrogen-Air-Methane Flames
The effect of temperature is shown in Figure 18, which is a plot
of flame speed versus the same concentration of methane at 75 ° C.
Of the inhibitors investigated, the following ciassification can be
made:
Good:
Fair:
Poor:
Saturated and unsaturated hydrocarbons, monohaloge-
nated hydrocarbons, brominated hydrocarbons, metal
carbonyls, some metal chlorides.
Hydrogen halides, inorganic sulphur compounds, par-
tially fluorinated and chlorinated hydrocarbons, some
metal halides.
Halogens, fully fluorinated and chlorinated hydrocar-
bons, oxides of carbon and nitrogen, silicon and
boron halides.
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Considering the small concentrations of additives needed to pro-
duce considerable changes in flame speed, there is little doubt that
these effects are due to changes in chemical kinetics, rather than in
physical properties such as thermal conductivity or flame temperature.
The most likely mode of action of hydrocarbons is the removal of
hydrogen atoms. For saturated hydrocarbons, this would come about
by reaction of the hydrogen atoms with inhibitor to form hydrogen
molecules
H + CH4--*H z + CH 3 •
In contrast, for unsaturated hydrocarbons it could be by addition of the
hydrogen atoms to the double bond
H + CzH4_C_-Is.
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In each case, a new free radical is formed, which is unstable but less
reactive than the H atom removed. The hydrocarbon radicals can com-
bine with each other; e. g. ,
Z CH3-" CzH 6 .
or be oxidized; e. g. ,
02 + CH3-- OH + HCHO .
The former reaction would be favored in rich mixtures, and the latter
in lean mixtures. That is, in lean mixtures active species that are
removed are more likely to get back into circulation, and this may be
one reason why hydrocarbon inhibitors are not effective in lean mix-
tures.
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Section VI. HYDROGEN HAZARDS TO SATURN SPACE VEHICLES
Only two production liquid hydrogen engines are in existence
today, the J-Z and the RE-10, both of which are used in the Saturn
space vehicles. The safety procedures that have been used for several
years in the handling of liquid hydrogen are also, in general, applicable
in the handling of liquid hydrogen engines. It is probably for this
reason that few special procedures have been developed specifically
for space vehicles. However, because of the large amounts of liquid
hydrogen involved and the criticalness of space missions, considerable
effort is being made to prevent hazardous situations before they occur
by properly designing the vehicle. Some of the preventive measures
normally applied include the following:
I) Liquid hydrogen is contained in properly designed vessels to
avoid the formation of dangerous mixtures and to remove sources of
ignition. This is accomplished by containing hydrogen in gas-tight
systems, or diluting and sweeping away hydrogen that has leaked out
inadvertently. Ignition control is applied to all potential sources of
ignition, and obviously no naked lights or flames are allowed. Much
attention is given to electrical devices because they can cause sparks
or hot spots as a result of failure or overloading. It is common prac-
tice to place such devices in flameproof enclosures which should be
sufficiently strong to withstand any explosion and to prevent transmission
of the flame to surrounding flammable gas. In this country, several
small electrical units, such as switches, junction boxes, etc. , are
certified as flameproof.
2) Prevention of flammable mixtures can also be accomplished by
maintaining a positive pressure inside a container or compartment,
thereby rendering leakage into it more difficult.
3) All equipment and piping is purged prior to the introduction of
hydrogen. Air is eliminated by purging first with nitrogen or other
inert gas.
4) Disposition of large quantities of liquid hydrogen that might be
required for a vehicle test stand can be accomplished at a rate up to
10 pounds per second, with short intermittent dumps of 100 pounds per
second. A disposal system developed by the Atomic Energy Commission
consists of a 40-foot high stainless-steel main flare stack with a special
flare tip capable of withstanding high and low temperatures, a molecular
seal, propane burners, and a remote ignition system. 3]
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In connection with the hydrogen hazards to space vehicles, Rocket-
dyne 3z is designing and developing a fire detection system for the upper
stages of the Saturn vehicle under Contract No. NAS8-11656. The
detection system which is being developed consists primarily of a single
lens optical system, filtered to transmit only UV radiation, and a lead
sulfide detector. The lens is a one-inch diameter, four-inch focal
length magnesium oxide lens which transmits UV radiation at wave-
lengths as low as 0. 25_x. The detector is actually a matched pair of
lead sulfide cells in a back-to-back arrangement where one cell views
the incoming radiation and the other is shielded from the radiation and
is used to compensate for any change in the temperature of the apparatus.
The radiometer includes provisions for a gaseous nitrogen purge to pre-
vent deposition of contaminants on the lens.
Rocketdyne's detection system is designed to operate throughout
the S-IC first stage flight, stage separation, and through second stage
ignition. Consequently, it was assumed that any propellant leak and
ignition source resulting from electrical and engine equipment malfunc-
tions between the Saturn vehicle propellant loading operations and the
second stage ignition, constitutes a fire-producing combination. Table IX
gives the possible prime leak sources on J-2 engines as determined by
Rocketdyne.
Table IX. Prime Leak Sources on Saturn Vehicle
Possible Prime Leak
Sources on J-2
Engines
Turbine gas generator
Liquid hydrogen turbo-
pump
Turbine gas generator
crossover duct (from
:he LH z to the LOX
pump turbines)
The fuel pump turbine
exhaust duct
The gaseous hydrogen
start tank relief valve
Leak Sources Associ-
ated with Saturn S-II
Engine Compartment
Installations
Engine service line
attach panel located
inside the S-II thrust
c one
Liquid hydrogen and
liquid oxygen recircu-
lating manifold ducts
located around the
thrust cone internal
pe riphe ry
Possible Thermal and
Electrical Ignition
Sources
Thermal:
Turbine gas generator
Turbopump
Turbine exhaust and
crossover ducts
Electrical:
The electrical equip-
ment and associated
cabling around the
Saturn S-If thrust cone
periphery
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